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204 millions in 2016; 5.6%.
l If they formed their own
country, the unemployed
would be the 5th largest
country in the world.
l High rates of long-term
structural unemployment;
l Example: Europe-5 (52.8%
in 2015, compared to OECD-
average of 33.8%).
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Addressing Shortcomings in LMR Literature
Large LMRs literature: E¢ ciency wages, U.Benets, Min wages,
C.Bargaining, Search [van Schaik & de Groot (2000), Meckl
(2004), Zagler (2009; 2011), Bhattacharyya & Gupta (2015),
Cacciatore & Fiori (2016), Chang & Hung (2016)]
Shortcomings that we attempt to address:
1. Key Issue: Simultaneous LMRs - In Practice, LMRs often
implemented in Packages. Ignoring Policy Externalities: a
potential source of bias.
2. Welfare e¤ects and trade-o¤s with growth;
3. Transitional dynamics (hence, dynamic trade-o¤s of LMRs)
often neglected due to limited attention to supply side of
workforce composition;
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Model Overview
Issues addressed in the following settings:
I Innovation driven OLG growth model, with heterogeneous
labor force (untrained & specialized), LM
rigidities-generated structural unemployment in equilibrium;
I 2-period individuals with di¤erent innate abilities; In old age,
time is allocated to leisure;
I 4 production sectors: manufacturing (homogeneous nal
good); intermediate goods (IGs); innovation (designs for
producing IGs); education (allows skills acquisition);
I Impact of LMRs is assessed not only in terms of
unemployment, growth, and welfare, but also misallocation
of talent.
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Individuals
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Skills Acquisition - depends on Expected S-U wage
Threshold level of ability, aCt , above which individuals choose to
undergo training depends on
(1  ULt )wUt + ULt bUt ,
(1  ")(SYt wSYt + SRt wSRt + SLt bSt )  tct ,
where  jt ; j = SY ; SR; SL;UL are respective probabilities.
Training cost proportional to expected S-wage & inversely related
to ability.
Key channel through which unemployment/public policy a¤ect
supply side of labor market.
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Overview of Production Sectors
Final Good Sector Innovation Sector
S-type labor supplyU-type labor supply
Wage rate, S-type
labor






Production Structure and the Labor Market
Education decision
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LMR Feature 1 (T.Union and Minimum Wage)
I FG: Wages set through a right-to-manage bargaining process
between a centralized trade union & rms.
I Union maximizes, for h = U;SY :
Vht = (w
h



















I Similar specication SY-workers.
I In a growth setting: minimum wage, target wages, and benet
rates must rise at same rate as (average) income.
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LMR Feature 2 (U.Insurance, Endogenous Payroll Taxes)
I Gov. operates u.insurance fund (nanced by payroll



















t + (1  ")(wSYt SYt + wSRt SRt )
:
I Implication:higher unemployment may raise the payroll tax if
wages do not fall enough; may further depress unemployment.
I To ensure nondegenerate solution, UI set as a linear function
of level of per capita income: bht = 
h Yt
N
; h = U;S :
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LMR Feature 3 (Innovation - E¢ ciency wage framework)
I Sub-utility function:
UR (wSRt ; 1  eRt ) = ln[(wSRt )R (1  eRt )1 R ]










) ; with  = R=(1 R );









with R > 1 a function of , a choice variable at the level of
rms.  1-to-1 to monitoring intensity (Shapiro-Stiglitz,
1984), which in turn varies inversely with unit monitoring cost
(exogenous) (van Schaik & de Groot (2000)).
I Solow condition satised.












I Supply of S-workers in innovation (aR > aC )
NRt =






I Supply of S-labor to manufacturing: NS   NSR where
NSR  NR is actual employment in innovation.
I Index of talent misallocation:
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with : social discount rate.
I Equal weight to each group; accounts for welfare of all current
and future generations;
I Approximation along the BGE (see paper).
I Alternative: varying weights; but rather arbitrary in such a
model without explicit modelling of insider-outsider.
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Parameterization and Policy Experiments
I Parameterize 2 sets & compare systematically between a HIC
benchmark (Europe-5) and MIC benchmark (Latin
America-5).
I Partial analysis of individual LMR Policies (min wage, UB
rates, cut in union wage mark-ups, training cost cut).
I Examining for policy externalities - Sum of Parts vs LT
e¤ect of Composite Reform Programmes.
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Main Results 1
I Key Results: LMRs entail a two-way causality between
growth and unemployment: dynamic trade-o¤s between
growth, unemployment, & welfare.
I Individual reforms may generate conicting e¤ects on
growth and welfare.
I Rea¢ rms literature that growth & unemployment has weak
relationship. . .
I . . . but policies promoting growth via direct skills expansion
tend to result in absorption problem/oversupply of qualied
labour (specialized unemployment rate going up).
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Steady-state Growth and Welfare E¤ects in a Snapshot
Individual and Composite Experiments: Steady-State Effects
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Main Results 2
I Popular recommendations/implementation of simultaneous
ambitious LM composite reforms can be costly due to
inadequate Policy Externalities.
I In MICs, where e¢ ciency level is lower in both public &
private sectors, public investment in infrastructure, through its
supply-side e¤ects, may help: (i) mitigate the
growth-welfare tradeo¤, and (ii) relieve the absorption
problem of specialized labor.
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Thank You
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Appendix
King Yoong Lim & Pierre-Richard Agenor Unemployment, LMRs, Growth and Welfare
Key di¤erences between MIC and HIC
I Higher e¢ ciency and lower cost of training in HIC.
I Lower degree of substitution between intermediate goods in
MIC.
I Higher elasticities of output and innovation activity with
respect to public capital in MIC.
I Higher share of S-workers in innovation in HIC.
I Higher e¢ ciency and lower cost of training in HIC.
I Lower degree of substitution between intermediate goods in
MIC.
King Yoong Lim & Pierre-Richard Agenor Unemployment, LMRs, Growth and Welfare
Key di¤erences between MIC and HIC
I Higher elasticities of output and innovation activity w.r.t
public capital in MIC.
I Higher share of S-workers in innovation in HIC.
I Higher open unemployment rate for U-workers (S-workers) in
HIC (MIC).
I Higher payroll tax rate in HIC.
I Higher degree of talent misallocation in MIC.
I Note: other important structural di¤erences are quality of
governance and share of spending on R&D in output.
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Benchmark Parameters
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Benchmark Parameters
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Initial Steady State Values
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Government
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